DSM is the easier and less expensive of the two. While IRP may require the introduction of renewable generation capacity, DSM typically involves utilities helping consumers insulate home heating systems, passing out CFL bulbs, conducting home energy audits, or upgrading consumers to programmable thermostats. In other words, it targets the lowest of the low hanging fruit. And this is exactly what PSE&G is doing. What's interesting here is that New Jersey's utilities are regulated under the traditional regulatory design scheme, which was described in the early 1960s in a paper by Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson. The Averch-Johnson Hypothesis describes how utilities tend to overcapitalize due to incentives inherent in traditional rate of return regulation. Briefly, overcapitalization maximizes profits under rate of return regulation because the return on capital investment is linked to the amount of the commodity - electricity - that is produced and sold. More electricity requires more power plants. In unregulated environments, as any first year B-school could tell you, utilities would invest in and produce only what the market demanded. In other words, rate of return regulation distorts the supply market by encouraging over production. As a result, consumers tend to use more electricity than they would otherwise. Regulators encourage this activity by mandating rates remain low.
So why would a utility in such a regulatory environment intentionally shoot its balance sheet in the foot? New Jersey is one of the signatories to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a multi-state agreement that calls for a 10 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2018 for 10 New England and Mid Atlantic states. RGGI, at least initially, is targeted specifically at power utilities. To attain this goal, RGGI has introduced a cap-and-trade system that will have its first emissions permit auction in September 2008. While PSE&G has neglected to mention the motivation behind the DSM proposal, it is likely they are undertaking the program as a way of reducing its exposure to what may be a fairly pricey emissions trading market. By encouraging conservation and energy efficiency among its consumers, PSE&G will be able to produce less electricity, thus reducing their rate of carbon emissions and the number of permits they will need to buy. This effect is similar to what occurred in the early 1990s with the introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme aimed at mitigating acid rain, except those changes occurred on the supply side. Twenty years ago, utilities began using SOX and NOX scrubbing technology because it was cheaper than buying emissions permits. This is also the same, though again on the supply side, as the European utilities that have invested billions of euros in wind capacity.
This leads to an interesting, though fairly obvious, conclusion. Utilities would rather make adjustments now that they know to be both cheaper and more controllable to their electricity production and greenhouse gas emissions rates than subject themselves later to a volatile and less certain market mechanism that they will be forced to compete in. Or at least introduce measures to hedge against potential future exposure. Though PSE&G's DSM proposal is fairly small scale it helps put in context actions undertaken by larger utilities - XCel's Smart Grid City in Colorado and Duke Energy's $100 million residential solar plan are both good examples, though these may also be viewed partly as measures aimed at complying with state-based renewable portfolio standards.
A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Emissions Auction
Daniel Englander: June 23, 2008, 11:34 PM
New Jersey's Public Service Electric & Gas Company, an investor owned utility, has filed a proposal with the state's Board of Public Utilities to launch a $45.9 million demand side management program. Demand side management (DSM) is a method utilities use to reduce consumer demand for electricity and gas through the introduction of efficiency measures and technologies. In regulatory environments where utilities are constrained by the amount of electricity they are allowed to produce, typically through mechanisms that determine ratemaking as a function of fixed asset investment alone and not through a combination of fixed asset investment and commodity sales, demand side management is used to curb consumer demand. Under the former regulatory mechanism, known commonly as decoupling, utilities are punished for exceeding their planned electricity production schedule. On the flip side, consumers - the ratepayers - are punished if utilities under produce and are unable to make a sufficient rate of return on their fixed asset investment. Such a regulatory mechanism requires a balance between consumer demand and utility supply, which can be accomplished through a combination of demand side management and integrated resource planning (IRP).
DSM is the easier and less expensive of the two. While IRP may require the introduction of renewable generation capacity, DSM typically involves utilities helping consumers insulate home heating systems, passing out CFL bulbs, conducting home energy audits, or upgrading consumers to programmable thermostats. In other words, it targets the lowest of the low hanging fruit. And this is exactly what PSE&G is doing. What's interesting here is that New Jersey's utilities are regulated under the traditional regulatory design scheme, which was described in the early 1960s in a paper by Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson. The Averch-Johnson Hypothesis describes how utilities tend to overcapitalize due to incentives inherent in traditional rate of return regulation. Briefly, overcapitalization maximizes profits under rate of return regulation because the return on capital investment is linked to the amount of the commodity - electricity - that is produced and sold. More electricity requires more power plants. In unregulated environments, as any first year B-school could tell you, utilities would invest in and produce only what the market demanded. In other words, rate of return regulation distorts the supply market by encouraging over production. As a result, consumers tend to use more electricity than they would otherwise. Regulators encourage this activity by mandating rates remain low.
So why would a utility in such a regulatory environment intentionally shoot its balance sheet in the foot? New Jersey is one of the signatories to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a multi-state agreement that calls for a 10 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2018 for 10 New England and Mid Atlantic states. RGGI, at least initially, is targeted specifically at power utilities. To attain this goal, RGGI has introduced a cap-and-trade system that will have its first emissions permit auction in September 2008. While PSE&G has neglected to mention the motivation behind the DSM proposal, it is likely they are undertaking the program as a way of reducing its exposure to what may be a fairly pricey emissions trading market. By encouraging conservation and energy efficiency among its consumers, PSE&G will be able to produce less electricity, thus reducing their rate of carbon emissions and the number of permits they will need to buy. This effect is similar to what occurred in the early 1990s with the introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme aimed at mitigating acid rain, except those changes occurred on the supply side. Twenty years ago, utilities began using SOX and NOX scrubbing technology because it was cheaper than buying emissions permits. This is also the same, though again on the supply side, as the European utilities that have invested billions of euros in wind capacity.
This leads to an interesting, though fairly obvious, conclusion. Utilities would rather make adjustments now that they know to be both cheaper and more controllable to their electricity production and greenhouse gas emissions rates than subject themselves later to a volatile and less certain market mechanism that they will be forced to compete in. Or at least introduce measures to hedge against potential future exposure. Though PSE&G's DSM proposal is fairly small scale it helps put in context actions undertaken by larger utilities - XCel's Smart Grid City in Colorado and Duke Energy's $100 million residential solar plan are both good examples, though these may also be viewed partly as measures aimed at complying with state-based renewable portfolio standards.
DSM is the easier and less expensive of the two. While IRP may require the introduction of renewable generation capacity, DSM typically involves utilities helping consumers insulate home heating systems, passing out CFL bulbs, conducting home energy audits, or upgrading consumers to programmable thermostats. In other words, it targets the lowest of the low hanging fruit. And this is exactly what PSE&G is doing. What's interesting here is that New Jersey's utilities are regulated under the traditional regulatory design scheme, which was described in the early 1960s in a paper by Harvey Averch and Leland Johnson. The Averch-Johnson Hypothesis describes how utilities tend to overcapitalize due to incentives inherent in traditional rate of return regulation. Briefly, overcapitalization maximizes profits under rate of return regulation because the return on capital investment is linked to the amount of the commodity - electricity - that is produced and sold. More electricity requires more power plants. In unregulated environments, as any first year B-school could tell you, utilities would invest in and produce only what the market demanded. In other words, rate of return regulation distorts the supply market by encouraging over production. As a result, consumers tend to use more electricity than they would otherwise. Regulators encourage this activity by mandating rates remain low.
So why would a utility in such a regulatory environment intentionally shoot its balance sheet in the foot? New Jersey is one of the signatories to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a multi-state agreement that calls for a 10 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2018 for 10 New England and Mid Atlantic states. RGGI, at least initially, is targeted specifically at power utilities. To attain this goal, RGGI has introduced a cap-and-trade system that will have its first emissions permit auction in September 2008. While PSE&G has neglected to mention the motivation behind the DSM proposal, it is likely they are undertaking the program as a way of reducing its exposure to what may be a fairly pricey emissions trading market. By encouraging conservation and energy efficiency among its consumers, PSE&G will be able to produce less electricity, thus reducing their rate of carbon emissions and the number of permits they will need to buy. This effect is similar to what occurred in the early 1990s with the introduction of a cap-and-trade scheme aimed at mitigating acid rain, except those changes occurred on the supply side. Twenty years ago, utilities began using SOX and NOX scrubbing technology because it was cheaper than buying emissions permits. This is also the same, though again on the supply side, as the European utilities that have invested billions of euros in wind capacity.
This leads to an interesting, though fairly obvious, conclusion. Utilities would rather make adjustments now that they know to be both cheaper and more controllable to their electricity production and greenhouse gas emissions rates than subject themselves later to a volatile and less certain market mechanism that they will be forced to compete in. Or at least introduce measures to hedge against potential future exposure. Though PSE&G's DSM proposal is fairly small scale it helps put in context actions undertaken by larger utilities - XCel's Smart Grid City in Colorado and Duke Energy's $100 million residential solar plan are both good examples, though these may also be viewed partly as measures aimed at complying with state-based renewable portfolio standards.
Phil Giudice, Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources, spoke today at Greentech Media's PV Annual 2008 on the Commonwealth's plan to hit grid parity with PV in the near future. The Commish took an interesting tack, though. Instead of waiting for module and installed costs to come down, he's going to wait for retail electricity prices to go up. Massachusetts has one of the highest retail electricity rates in the country - about $0.15/kWh, putting it up there with Hawaii, New York and California. According to Giudice, rising natural gas prices will push this price up to (and past) $0.20/kWh. Wholesale natural gas prices have risen close to 40 percent in the last few years, which has had a drastic effect on the cost of electricity generation in the Commonwealth.
But how will this affect PV prices? Most analysts have pointed to $4.00 per watt as the tipping for explosive demand growth in the PV market. However, given the still unpredictable polysilicon supply market, the inability of a-Si and CIGS manufacturers to ramp up volume production to meet demand, and the likely failure of production tax credits in the U.S., it is unlikely the installed system cost will drop to this level until 2012 at the earliest. Giudice thinks this is relatively unimportant. Backed by the right policy-based incentives, like Massachusetts's Commonwealth Solar Initiative - a $68 million plan to increase PV capacity in the state to 250 MW by 2017, pushing PV on the market at prices above $4.00 per watt will work as long as the natural gas-based retail electricity rates continue growing at their precipitous rate.
Hearing this argument, Prometheus Institute President Travis Bradford put his head in his hands and exclaimed, "That's good. I was right. That was lucky." Travis has long predicted possible tipping points occurring before the $4.00 per watt price mark. The Commonwealth Solar Initiative, combined with Massachusetts's participation in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, as well as Giudice's work promoting the expansion of net metering and RPS caps, means the PV market in Massachusetts has the potential to exhibit a 40 percent cumulative annual growth rate. Based on this, Giudice thinks it may be possible to generate between 20 percent and 40 percent of the state's electricity from PV if retail electricity rates remain at the $0.20/kWh level - or maybe more if they go higher. This is equivalent to 2.5 GW to 5 GW of installed PV capacity.
With global installed levels hovering around 7 GW, and with projections for 10 GW to 12 GW by 2011, Giudice's goal is nothing but ambitious. However, countered against rising electricity prices, Giudice argues PV is the most "effective hedge against a rising fossil fueled future." Proposals to resurrect the state's whale oil industry failed to gain the necessary votes in the State House. Something about the smell.




