Something stinks at Imperium Renewables, and it’s not the Southeast Asian palm oil. In the last few weeks the company has shed its CEO, pulled back from a much anticipated initial public offering, and (this week) announced cuts to its corporate work force. Sam from HR and Diane from marketing are packing their cubicles, leaving the engineers to run the shop. Cutting back at corporate is like a late ‘90s internet company selling the Ferrari and the ping pong table - bouncing the unnecessary costs to keep the ship afloat. For a company once regarded as the boy genius of biofuel it is clear now Imperium is muddling its way through what can charitably be called Act II of Titus Andronicus. So the question remains, are things at Imperium as bad as they seem, or is another example of the growing pains many analysts expect green tech companies will experience as the market matures? For the answer, I offer a short trip down memory lane.
In August 2007 Imperium opened its 100 million gallon capacity, $78 million biodiesel plant in Grays Harbor near Seattle. Operating at full production, Imperium anticipated controlling 40 percent of the U.S. biodiesel market by 2009. Current domestic production was pegged at 75 million gallons, with projections of 1 billion by the end of 2009. Imperium’s initial calculation was based both on full production at Grays Harbor and an expected 300 million gallon capacity expansion at proposed plants in Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Argentina that were expected to be completed by the end of 2008. To finance the expansion, Imperium filed an S-1 with the SEC in May 2007 announcing its intention to raise a $345 million IPO. $220 million would go to the new plants. The IPO, in addition to its previous $214 million in equity and debt financing, would have left the company enough capital to build the plants and maintain a steady flow of palm oil feedstock from Southeast Asia.
Whoa! $100 oil! I bet Martin Tobias, Imperium’s imperius ex-CEO, never saw
Regulatory scrutiny is beginning to fall over the $100 million a year carbon offset market. On January 8th the FTC held its first public hearing to investigate advertising and deceptive practices in the sale of carbon offsets to consumers. These include “double counting� of emissions reductions and investing in projects with little or no mitigation impact. The carbon offset market is effectively unregulated, with a handful of third parties buying, selling, and investing carbon offsets on behalf of consumers and companies alike. While some carbon offsets are effective, the vast majority are having a minimal or non existent impact on global emissions reduction, and primarily serve to provide a green veneer for crunchy consumers and corporations seeking to burnish their image during a slumping economy.
Fraud, however, is not the real crime here. Companies like Dell, General Electric, and Delta Airlines, as well as the roughly 30 carbon offset intermediaries, are tapping into consumer desire to invest in carbon mitigation strategies. This is misplaced capital that could be going towards building renewable energy capacity, developing new green technologies, or buying energy efficient home appliances. Ultimately, environmentalism needs to realize its now a market, not a social movement, and we’re not playing with Monopoly money. The decisions companies and consumers make have real consequences, and the invested capital represents real opportunities, not charitable donations.
This might seem like kind of a self-defeating question, or self-destroying, but who cares. If this whole thing tanks we’re off to Mexico; sayonara suckers.
But the question is actually not self-defeating, because it’s answer is ‘Yes’, though it remains worth asking because greentech isn’t any kind of traditional market. It’s a practice; it’s an idea; it’s a tactic. Greentech is in one form a non-taxonomic label that can be applied to pretty much any existing technology, a modifier to some pre-existing machine. There are some technologies that are specifically green: solar, wind, wave, and other types of power generation exist for no reason other than to minimize carbon fuels consumption and carbon exhaust expulsion.
Those aside, though, green or clean technologies not only are just modifiers to existing tech, but should be. Most agree that our short-term carbon impact could be best mitigated through greater efficiencies in existing systems. The required financial investment for alternate power sources to sufficiently reduce our carbon output may not be possible (politically, anyway) from the existing global economy. Beyond that, the required lead times for getting enough power online may be more than we have if we are to prevent a global tipping, not to mention more than most investors have if they’re to see returns. So greentech must become a strategy of modification, altering existing infrastructure with smaller increments of time and money spent. And in this way it is not a market like telecom or personal computers or web applications. Those following it are not united by common technology, jargon, and job prospects, but by an abstract belief in some combination of its importance and profitability.
That is the particular challenge of it as a market or a movement, that it’s members don’t have as much shared language as they did when they were in other markets—as they all recently were. There is the shared language of money, and perhaps of ideology, and maybe the word ‘carbon’, but that’s a thin frame upon which to build what should by all rights some day be the rapid successor to the information market of today, the new, green, industrial revolution.
Greentech Media's Green Light blog covers the full-scope of the greentech world, while expanding the range of our daily news reporting with brief and insightful blog posts from our Greentech Media editors, GTM Research analysts and numerous guest bloggers.