Many cleantech investors were cheered by the successful IPO of A123 this past week.
I noted a very interesting column on PE Hub (sub req'd), by Lawrence Aragon, one of the finer private equity journalists out there.
(We need to caveat all this by acknowledging that it's unlikely much of the VCs' returns have been realized yet, there's typically a lock-up period. So here's hoping the market valuation holds up. Still, Lawrence's approach of using current valuations is still quite useful for our illustrative purposes...)
Lawrence takes a look at estimated investment totals and returns for major VCs in the company, and concludes that these investors didn't produce "a huge return", because the major holders only got like 4x or 5x. But let's look at that a little deeper. One thing that really struck me about Lawrence's column is that his assumption seems to be that these were all venture investments, and that therefore if you don't get a 10x you didn't get a "high voltage charge" for "venture investors".
I would argue that much of the pre-IPO capital that was put into A123 wasn't "venture capital", at least in the sense Lawrence seems to mean it. Let me illustrate what I mean: If you have the chance to make 2x on an investment over 1 year, would you do it? Sure, 100% IRRs are pretty sweet. 2x over 2 years, 3x over 3 years are all pretty attractive returns as well, on an IRR basis. So when Lawrence points to 4x type returns to "venture investors", he seems to be assuming that these were long-term holders, but many weren't. The Series D was in 2007, for example, and was at an approximate pre-money of $300M. Right now, that return looks pretty good on an IRR basis, even after an extra year's delay past the originally intended IPO date. North Bridge, for example, was looking at a much higher multiple on their investment before they had to pump in an extra $10M as part of a May 2009 Series F, and while that very late round yielded a much smaller multiple, it was over just a few months, and probably looks great right now on an IRR basis.
So I don't think Lawrence crystalized the point he was trying to make. However, I think the A123 experience illustrates a couple of important principles at work in cleantech investing today:
1. I continue to have a hard time thinking about pre-IPO equity investments at pre-money valuations in the hundreds of millions as being "venture capital". At very least, we need a new sub-category to describe this type of investing. We have early stage investing, the Series As and Series Bs that are what most outsiders think of when they think of "venture capital" (if at all), typically aiming (read: "hoping") for a 10x return over 5-7 years. Then you have "growth stage" venture capital, which is later-stage VC investing, aiming for a 5x in 3-5 years. But as I noted back in that August 2008 post, much of the Series E (June '08, ~$100M raise, approx. $1B pre-money) appears to have been provided by first-time investors. These investors weren't brought into the raise as "venture capitalists," I guarantee you. Instead, it's probably best to think about that type of investment as a "mezz equity round". In other words, the expectations were probably for a 2x in 1-2 years. That's not necessarily better or worse investing than "venture capital" as Lawrence is referring to. But it's certainly different. It means a simple analysis of returns based on multiples is useless if all these types of investors are bundled together.
2. Growth and even "equity mezz" financing isn't as low-risk as it's made out to be. It's worth noting that those Series E investors are the ones who didn't make out so well. Right now it's looking good as A123 trades almost 50% above its IPO price, so if that holds up through their holding periods they may still make out with a 1.5x return. But the initial offering price appears to have been at just about the same post-money (around $1.1B) valuation of the Series E. So a zero return at that price. And since my write-up last August after the Series E, apparently investors needed to pony up an additional $99M Series F round according to the updated S-1... and that was at a significant down round valuation (something like $9.20/sh vs. the Series E's $16/sh).
A lot of non-VC investors such as family offices and hedge funds have been brought into these kinds of mezz equity rounds in the past. The pitch to those investors is, "hey, this company is going to IPO, and you're going to double your money over a year or so -- you can't lose!" What we've learned about these kinds of rounds in thin-film solar, and now with A123, is that even at that late stage there's still plenty of risk of an exit not happening in the timeframe anticipated, or at a lower than hoped for valuation, or perhaps not at all.
There's this theory out there that being a very late investor into cleantech is the way to go because the risk has been taken out of the equation. Do the later investors into thin-film solar companies still feel that the risk of a timely and high-valuation exit was low? Do the Series E investors in A123 feel like the risk was low in retrospect, after a year of holding their breath amid high cash burn and a down round and no exit window in sight? It worked out for A123. But so far, for most of the large late-round investors in cleantech, the exits still haven't appeared. We all know early stage cleantech venture capital is risky. But when I see it said/written/implied that we somehow can conclude with confidence that early stage cleantech VC doesn't make sense because it's "too risky, too long" whereas growth stage is the "smart way to do cleantech", I just shake my head. And when anyone tells me I "can't lose" on a later-stage investment, I run away as fast as I can, because there's no such thing.
So basically, I look at the A123 IPO and am cheered. I see it as being a sign of more good exits to come, in a sector that really needs them. And I believe it shows us something about the shape of cleantech venture investing right now.
The headline-grabbing news this week is Khosla Venture's recent fund closings, of their $275M seed fund and $800M "main fund". It's good to see more seed capital available in the sector -- as we've talked about here before, things have probably shifted too heavily toward late stage deals over the past few quarters, leaving a critical funding gap at the seed stage for cleantech startups. And it's also good, I think, to see such seed efforts split out into a separate fund from later-stage efforts. In many of the larger recent cleantech funds, seed and growth stage have been conflated within the same fund, which sets up some internal management challenges and also from an LP's perspective makes it tough to find specialized early stage focus.
In the NYT article about the closings, however, I was a bit surprised to see the suggestion that a few million dollars' worth of investment is all it takes for a cleantech startup to prove their technology to the point of being able to secure project financing. Now note, I'm not going to pick on Vinod for that quote, because I would bet there were nuances to it that didn't pass through the journalist-editor translation. But it brings up an important point to discuss, nonetheless.
There is in fact a huge capital gap for cleantech startups around early project finance. In most cleantech startups that will actually be producing anything (as opposed to software-based cleantech startups), building out production or manufacturing capacity is capital-intensive by definition. To build out a commercial-scale solar fab could require tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Ditto for biofuel plants, for utility-scale solar generation facilities, and for battery manufacturing lines.
The problem is, project finance is traditionally very risk-averse, and very intolerant of any new technology. Project finance firms are very good at structuring deals to enable the build-out of large generation or manufacturing projects, as long as they're not taking any technology risk and as long as the construction timeframe and future revenues and costs are very well understood. That's why project finance will take a much lower expected rate of return than venture capital, because it's correspondingly lower risk.
So what we've seen this decade in cleantech has been the inability of cleantech startups to raise project finance or high levels of leverage for their first or even second commercial-scale facilities. Even after having "proven" the technology at a pilot plant scale, it's still too early for project financiers to feel they have a good understanding of the construction timeframes and costs for a first of a kind ("FOAK") commercial scale plant. Also, in many cases the market acceptance is still not locked in, and furthermore the technology will likely not be proven out to nearly the level of confidence that the project financiers would want to see. So they just don't touch such things.
Thus, for the past few years we've seen venture capitalists stepping in to fund the FOAKs out of necessity. When you see a $100M+ solar round, for example, there's some working capital and growth equity in there, but the majority of it is going to fill the gap that project finance is unwilling to fund. It's not really venture capital. It's quasi- project finance.
I'm not against this type of activity per se, it can still provide some attractive risk-adjusted returns when it's done creatively. But it's tough to see how that type of activity can be expected to generate the kinds of absolute returns that VCs are telling their LPs they're targeting, unless there's an opportunity to push a very, very attractive near-term exit afterwords (and there are few such exits right now). And so when it gets done out of the same venture fund, it's just important to note that it's a bit of a stretch on the definition of "venture capital" as traditionally used. So be it, rules are made to be broken.
However, what we've seen very clearly over the past 12 months is that such financing will greatly dry up at times. And a number of high-flying startups have been left high and dry by the pull-back of VCs from FOAK funding. So it's strange to get the impression from the NYT article that it's fine for VCs to invest in early stage capital-intensive opportunities, because it won't take much capital for the henceforth "proven" technology to bring in project finance to support full-scale commercialization. FOAKs remain a big gap, one that has already killed a number of promising cleantech startups that had taken in tens of millions of dollars just to get to that point. What I'm guessing the quote was really intended to say was that non-traditional players like corporate partners, large family offices and government financing can help solve the FOAK challenge, and to an extent that's true. But it's far from the slam-dunk prospect that comes across in the article.
With $275M to put to work, at around $2M per first-time check, that "seed" Khosla fund must be planning on doing some significant follow-ons (tough to see how they would be able to manage upwards of 100 investments). And then with the additional $800M in the "main" fund, it's probably a safe bet that KV will have to put some money into FOAKs just like many other VCs have. Investors may have been advocating for smaller funds focused on capital efficient opportunities. But there's little evidence such advocacy has really taken hold in Silicon Valley.
Deals from the past week or so:
Other news and notes: Another nobel laureate has come out as a pessimist on fuel cells -- at least "present" ones... Here's a good list of the recipients of the recently-announced ARRA battery and EV awards... Finally, if you're going to be in Boston on October 27th, check out the cleantech networking session being organized by PE Hub, featuring five insightful panelists (oh, and yours truly as well).
I spent a couple of busy days in Washington, DC this week, meeting with old colleagues and making some new connections. (And I drove all 1,000 round-trip miles instead of taking the train, how do you like me now, Xconomy!) One thing that was impressively clear in DC is how front-and-center energy technology is among staffers on the Hill. A lot of very important things being worked on there right now, and minds seem to be pretty focused. Great to see. Unfortunately, it’s also clear that the entire cleantech venture and startup community is gearing up to bombard the Hill and the DOE with funding requests...
Meanwhile, outside of the Beltway, it’s starting to feel like maybe some cleantech VCs are starting to get back in the game. It’s just anecdotal, but I see my colleagues in the industry getting more serious about doing deals, after a hiatus of a few months.
For a while there, even VCs with capital left in their funds were sitting on the sidelines. The limited partner community just wasn’t making commitments to funds. So VCs were forced to consider that it might be a long time before they could raise additional capital. And thus, even if they still had capital left in their existing funds, they needed to hoard their resources and a) make sure they had enough in reserve to fully back their existing investments; and b) make sure that they stretched out their remaining new deals, so doing fewer deals over the course of 2009 than they had originally anticipated.
Of course, many funds are still in this situation, so it’s not like dealflow is coming rushing back. It’s still a very difficult time for VCs to raise capital from limited partners, and thus it’s still a very difficult time for startups to raise capital from VCs. But I do see some faint stirrings of life out there.
Naturally, however, that won’t be reflected in recent deal announcements, since there’s a significant lag between VC interest and then deals and then the eventual press releases… So here are the few announced deals from the past week:
Other news and notes: REBN continues to grow, with another great REBN-MidAtlantic event in Philly, and a new chapter being launched in North Carolina... If you’re reading the NYT Mag article on Freeman Dyson today, here’s Hansen’s reply... A good catch-up on cleantech in the Pacific Northwest… Here’s a cogent critique of efforts to focus on breakthrough R&D efforts in energytech instead of driving adoption of already-commercialized energy efficiency technologies… You heard it here last—Al Gore is planning a new book timed to impact the upcoming climate legislation debate in Washington… Finally, the Conspicuous Consumption Award has to go to this vacuum, which nature must certainly abhor—if you can afford to buy it, I’m guessing you’re not using it yourself.
Even in this economy, cleantech deals keep happening. We’re way behind on mentioning them here, so here’s a catch-up of sorts:
Cleantech investors and other luminaries in the news:
Other news and notes: Here in Boston, what sounds like a terrific group has been launched—New England Women in Energy and the Environment (NEWIEE)... Meanwhile, on the policy front, without getting into the pros and cons of it, it’s worth pointing out the cleantech implications of an emerging debate on patent reform, as illustrated by this column [3/16 update: changed link]... Also, here’s another good article looking at the implications from the mention of cap and trade in Obama’s budget… China’s cleantech sector took in $1.3B in venture capital and private equity last year, 120% up from 2007, according to one survey... Xconomy’s been running through a list of cleantech companies in selected regions, such as this list of Oregon players... Martin LaMonica searches for the Google of cleantech... Clean Edge released their latest annual clean energy market report, and while 2008 was a record year, they suggest 2009 won’t be so rosy… In Britain, the BVCA has set up an energy, environment and technology group... Finally, “Show of hands,” everyone!
During several discussions I’ve had with industry observers and fellow venture investors over the past few weeks, the topic of biofuels have come up, and those I’ve spoken with have mentioned “Vinod’s bad bet” on ethanol. Their point being that Khosla Ventures and Vinod Khosla himself placed a number of different ethanol bets and then publicly backed that sector, which is now seen as being somewhat out of favor.
But that conclusion is probably off-base, in my opinion.
First of all, most of Khosla Ventures’ biofuels investments haven’t been first-generation (ie: corn- and sugar-based) ethanol, which is the specific subsector that is out of favor right now. The jury is still out on cellulosic ethanol—people have strongly-held views both ways on the technology, but in the meantime most startups in the cellulosic space are still waiting to find out if they’ll have a good path to market and exit, they haven’t had to put up or shut up yet. And many of the other biofuels bets in the Khosla Ventures portfolio, like LS9 and Gevo, are even further out in terms of tech and market development. So it’s a bit unfair to point at just the corn-based ethanol and other first-gen bets in that portfolio and say that the verdict on their biofuels strategy is in.
And it’s also not quite clear that even the first-gen biofuels bets by Khosla Ventures haven’t been smart ones, from a strategic perspective. Regardless of what the individual investments themselves look like, it’s important to recognize that Khosla Ventures has taken a different strategic approach to their investment thesis around biofuels than most venture firms take. Khosla’s been happy to place multiple bets across a single sector, whereas many firms prefer to only place a couple of bets in any given sector. Why be different? Because of the special advantages Khosla has. He’s writing his own checks, not having to report to an investment committee. He has been actively leveraging his own personal brand equity and political access to bring government dollars and private sector attention to the ethanol story.
Most venture firms don’t want to end up having their portfolio companies compete against each other. But by taking more of a concentrated approach to ethanol, Khosla Ventures appears to be betting that they can take advantage of a rising tide raising all boats, when they own half the fleet in the harbor (I overstate, but you get the point), and being able to combine those efforts when opportune. And also betting that they can make the tide rise faster than it would have otherwise. It’s a very specialized strategy that only works when a very quick and flexible investor with a lot of political access and brand equity can identify an investment thesis ahead of the crowd and take a strong early position in that sector. And then, as Vinod does, speak anywhere and everywhere, and visit D.C. regularly, to make the case for the sector. Hard work, but something many other venture investors couldn’t duplicate.
Such an investment/political/PR strategy also only works, however, if there are near-term jobs and revenues to tout. Politicians need to see jobs creation opportunities in order to do their part of this kind of sectoral strategy. Revenues and exits need to be seen in the near term by the press and the private sector before they’ll play their roles in the development of the sector. So to effectively pursue this strategy, it becomes necessary to make some investments in first-gen players that are relatively close to market. These first-gen players then become key examples to point to. And even more importantly, perhaps, they can provide an eventual platform for the second-generation technologies that end up working the best, accelerating the paths to market for cellulosic players that would otherwise have to build capacity that would potentially be redundant to whatever first-gen players were already in the market by that time.
Long story short, you don’t need to believe in sugar- and corn-based ethanol as a long-term story in order to want to make a couple of bets on such companies, if you’re Khosla Ventures. You just have to believe that the first-gen bets you’re making will be a good bridge for your second-gen bets.
The problem? The market turned against first-gen ethanol much quicker than anyone expected. A controversy about food and energy balances arising at almost the same time that oil prices drop precipitously and corn markets go out of whack. Many people predicted some or all of these things would come to pass eventually. I don’t know anyone who thought all that would happen in 2008.
Does that mean it was a bad strategy? Nope. And by the way, as per the first point above, their overall biofuels strategy may still end up making great returns anyway. Political support and incentives for biofuels don’t seem to be going away. And the sector continues to develop even as first-gen players fall out.
Vinod and Khosla Ventures certainly don’t need the likes of me to defend their biofuels strategy. Plus, I’ve probably gotten it all wrong from their perspective, I haven’t discussed the above with anyone on that team, so I’m likely guilty of projecting my own views more than reflecting theirs. But I thought this might be a useful case study to point out a few unique things about the cleantech venture sector, and put down my two cents’ worth.
Spent the entire day driving up and down Sand Hill Road today, catching up with west coast investors I hadn’t seen in quite a while, and it was a pretty informative (and extremely long and tiring) day.
I’d been told by Brian Fan, the Senior Director of Research at the Cleantech Group (he pulls together all their deal tallies), that “the starting point on valuation right now is 50% of the valuation of the last round.” Provocative stuff. However, I suspect that says more about the “Valley Valuation” inflation that had been happening in ‘07-‘08 in a couple of high profile sectors, rather than a dramatic valuation reset across the board. Basically, that may be true in solar, and after all, solar is 40% of the dollars that went into cleantech in 2008, so it’s easy (but probably wrong) to paint the entire sector with that brush.
That having been said, a 61 cents per dollar secondaries discount level is a sobering valuation statistic, even if it has selection bias.
But regardless of valuation, it’s clear everyone expects to see a lot more high-profile startups that are completely resetting. In other words, doing a restart, raising a small round and considering it a Series A, crushing down the previous ownership (and often, tens of millions of dollars previously invested in the company), repositioning the company toward some kind of “Plan B”. This will mean some good buying opportunities, but also is going to be a serious hiccup in the market, when even relatively healthy startups can’t raise the money to keep moving forward and have to abandon their plans.
It was also clear that the downturn is affecting different investors in very different ways. Some were having to take a breather, just pulling back on their cleantech efforts (albeit unofficially, of course). Others are hungry and active and seeing lots of buying opportunities.
1H09 is starting to feel like quite a crucible period for the cleantech venture community and their investments.
Also notable: Everyone is now interested in some flavor of energy efficiency/ smart grid. And no one told me (as I’d occasionally been told before) that they were actively looking for more capital intensive opportunities.
Deal announcements since the last update:
Other news and notes:
Freakonomics on cleantech... Doerr and Friedman on U.S. cleantech competitiveness... Meanwhile Obama calls for doubling renewable energy in three years... And UK conservatives are bidding for regional leadership as well... Earth2Tech puts up 10 predictions—and Neal tears them down... Neal also is down on solar... 78 percent spike in land-use applications for solar projects... More cleantech layoffs—here and here... Finally, I thought this was amusing, and it gives me the excuse to type ‘Wollongong’.
Based upon the spate of cleantech VC interviews I’ve seen lately and what my fellow investors are saying, it’s clear that “capital efficiency” is the new watchword as we head into 2009.
So expect to see some $25mm Series B rounds into cleantech-related software plays.
On a related note, here’s my latest column from the Mass High Tech journal.
Here’s the final catch-up on 2008 deals and news:
Cleantech investors in the news:
Other news and notes: Earth2Tech’s 10 biggest cleantech victories of 2008 don’t include any real wins for VCs—unless you consider spending a ton of money as a “victory” (writing checks is the easy part, after all)... Eric Wesoff’s list of the top ten deals in 2008 (note: opens pdf) had to be expanded into a top 21 list so it wouldn’t be quite so dominated by solar deals (except it still is)... For those interested in ultracaps, here’s EEStor’s latest patent—what struck me was the Summary of the Invention, which comes as close to “patent application as marketing doc” as I’ve yet seen… Here’s a critical take on the claims that First Solar has achieved “grid parity”... A cool picture of General Fusion’s device… An interesting cleantech survey by Cooley Godward… Tesla is far from the only company getting affected thusly by the downturn, they’re just one that gets written about a lot… VC investments in Indian cleantech startups may get tax breaks... Finally, I don’t think I’ve linked to CleanTechnica.com before, so here you go!
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Rob Day is a Boston-based cleantech venture capital investor and entrepreneur, and is also the President of the Renewable Energy Business Network (REBN). The views expressed on this blog are those of Rob and his friends and colleagues, not necessarily the views of REBN or Greentech Media or any other group. Contact Rob Day at: (JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address)